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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Arthur Richmond appeals from his judgment of conviction upon a 
jury's verdict that he is guilty of aggravated assault. Richmond asserts the 
district court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding self-defense, 
and erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the court's failure to give 
the jury a unanimity instruction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Richmond with aggravated assault against his then-
fiance Michelle Williams. (R., pp. 20-21; Tr., p. 156, Ls. 11-14. 1) Richmond 
committed the assault while driving his car, with Williams in the passenger seat. 
(Tr., p. 158, Ls. 14-21.) 
The two got into an argument while driving from Garden City to Meridian. 
(Tr., p. 164, Ls. 2-7.) Richmond screamed and cussed and called Williams 
names, then punched Williams in the side of the head with enough force that her 
head hit the windshield. (Tr., p. 159, Ls. 14-16; p. 160, Ls. 12-18.) Richmond 
continued to punch Williams in the eyes, nose, mouth, chest, arms, legs, and 
1 The appellate record includes two transcripts, paginated separately. One 
includes most of the trial proceedings, Richmond's hearing on motion for new 
trial, and sentencing; that transcript will be referenced herein as "Tr." The 
second transcript, described on the cover page as "Volume 1" includes the trial 
proceedings from jury instruction conference through the verdict and Richmond's 
guilty plea to the persistent violator charge; that transcript will be referenced 
herein as "Tr., Vol. 1." 
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hands when she put her hands up to defend herself. (Tr., p. 160, L. 20 - p. 161, 
Ls. 18.) Through this, Williams "was in and out of consciousness." (Tr., p. 161, 
L. 1.) At some point, Richmond took Williams' seatbelt with his hand "and 
started choking [her] with it." (Tr., p. 162, L. 19 - p. 163, L. 5.) Richmond later 
told police that "[h}e grabbed her by the throat with ... the old up-and-under 
move." (Tr., p. 150, Ls. 7-8.) 
After they arrived at Richmond's mother's house, Williams went to a 
neighbor's house and the neighbor drove Williams to a bar where her friends 
were. (Tr., p. 164, Ls. 8-1 0; p. 165, Ls. 13-24.) Williams had a shot of whiskey 
and a beer, then went to two other bars where friends bought her other drinks. 
(Tr., p. 166, Ls. 9-23.) Williams testified that she is an alcoholic, and that she 
drinks when things are bad to numb the pain. (Tr., p. 168, L. 17 - p. 169, L. 1.) 
A bartender who saw Williams testified she "was crying. She had blood on her 
clothes. Her nose was bleeding. She was bruised and swollen." (Tr., p. 215, 
Ls. 15-17.) The bartender asked Williams "what happened, and pretty much 
called 911 right after that." (Tr., p. 215, L. 21 - p. 216, L. 4.) 
Williams recalled talking to police about the assault. (Tr., p. 169, Ls. 17-
25.) A corporal dispatched to the scene testified Williams was "[e]xtreme [sic] 
swollen on her face, both eyes swollen, starting to turn black and blue, nose was 
bleeding heavily, blood on her clothing ... marks on her throat going around to 
her neck." (Tr., p. 131, L. 24 - p. 132, L. 24; p. 133, L. 25 - p. 134, L. 4; State's 
Exhibits 1-7.) The corporal described injuries to Williams' jaw, throat, and chest 
as "all consistent with strangulation marks." (Tr., p. 137, Ls. 11-16.) The 
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corporal further testified, "typical strangulation marks are finger width. These are 
very, very wide. A lot of force. There is even some scratching and some 
burning-type looking marks consistent with rug burns." (Tr., p. 137, Ls. 19-24.) 
When paramedics arrived, Williams told them what happened to cause 
her injuries, but refused to go to the hospital. (Tr., p. 191, Ls. 14-24; p. 203, Ls. 
24-25.) A paramedic testified that Williams "had lots of swelling around both 
eyes, swollen nose, [and] swollen lip with bleeding," consistent with more than 
one punch, and an indication of a possible fracture below the right eye. (Tr., p. 
205, Ls. 2-25.) 
After interviewing Williams, the corporal contacted Richmond in Meridian, 
and observed he had "[b]lood on his hands and blood on his clothing'" and a 
"black-and-blue mark [in the] area of [his] right eye." (Tr., p. 142, Ls. 14-22; p. 
143, Ls. 2-3; p. 144, Ls. 18-19.) Also, Richmond had "swelling on [his] right 
hand[;] knuckles, fingers, clearly bigger than [his left] hand." (Tr., p. 146, Ls. 2-6; 
State's Exhibits 9-16.) 
Another officer photographed the inside of Richmond's car. (Tr., p. 227, 
L. 5 - p. 228, L. 9; State's Exhibits 17-32.) That officer described "a bunch of 
blood ... on the front passenger's seat," the backrest, and center console, as 
well as the back passenger's seat. (Tr., p. 230, L. 4 - p. 232, L. 15.) The officer 
also testified there was blood on the front passenger seatbelt, "up towards the -
where the right shoulder would be," and on the driver's seat headrest. (Tr., p. 
233, Ls. 8-11; p. 234, Ls. 2-11.) 
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Richmond testified that he and Williams were "having an animated 
conversation" during the drive to Meridian, and he tried to soothe her when she 
got upset describing a bad dream. (Tr., p. 272, Ls. 1-3; p. 275, L. 9 - p. 276, L. 
4; p. 276, L. 23 - p. 277, L. 17.) According to Richmond, they stopped at a 
friend's home to get some marijuana, but the friend was not home. (Tr., p. 278, 
L. 22 - p. 279, L. 3.) Richmond testified that, as he drove away from the friend's 
house, Williams suddenly punched him in the side of the head. (Tr., p. 280, Ls. 
20-24.) When asked if he knew why she hit him, Richmond testified, "That I do 
not know," then added, "But prior to that she insisted that I ... [g]o back to our 
friend's house ... and try again" to get some marijuana, but he had "told her no." 
(Tr., p. 280, L. 25 - p. 281, L. 8.) Richmond claims Williams then punched him a 
second time, straight in the face. (Tr., p. 281, Ls. 16-20.) 
According to Richmond, he pulled over and told her to get out of the truck. 
(Tr., p. 282, L. 2 - p. 283, L. 21.) When she refused, Richmond testified, he 
said, "Are you going to behave, because ... [t]his is not going to work for us .... 
What's gotten into you today? ... I need you to hold it together until we get 
home." (Tr., p. 283, L. 25 - p. 284, L. 15.) Richmond testified that Williams 
agreed, and he began driving again. (Tr., p. 284, Ls. 10-15; p. 285, Ls. 9-11.) 
Richmond testified he asked Williams how she was doing, but she said nothing, 
then a moment later, she "reached out and grabbed me by my shirt sleeve and 
pulled me forward and started pummeling me ... hitting me on the side of the 
head and the face." (Tr., p. 286, Ls. 11-20.) Richmond testified that he put his 
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hand up "to block her from hitting [him], [and] [s]he caught me with a real good 
one, and I pulled the wheel over." (Tr., p. 286, Ls. 20-23.) 
Richmond described that Williams kept hitting him as they headed toward 
oncoming traffic, and "there was nothing else that I could do, so I started to fight 
back." (Tr., p. 287, Ls. 3-15.) Richmond testified he "was trying to get [Williams} 
off of [him]" and then he felt he "connected a really good shot . . . I made 
contact." (Tr., p. 288, Ls. 5-20.) After that solid hit, he swung again and "felt 
another solid contact that had hit." (Tr., p. 288, Ls. 20-21.) Richmond testified 
that Williams "was still pushing toward [him]" so he did "that up-and-under move" 
which involved grabbing her sweatshirt and pushing her back into her seat. (Tr., 
p. 289, Ls. 2-10.) Richmond testified he somehow continued to drive to his 
mother's house, with he and Williams "still hanging onto one another." (Tr., p. 
289, L. 12 - p. 290, L. 21.) 
According to Richmond, after arriving at his mother's, they went to the 
back porch and talked for 10-15 minutes. (Tr., p. 291, L. 16 - p. 292, L. 4.) 
Richmond testified he told Williams, "I love you, Sugar, but what was that all 
about? ... I don't understand your rationale of what you were doing .... This is 
not good for us at all." (Tr., p. 292, Ls. 8-16.) 
The jury found Richmond guilty of aggravated assault (R., p. 108), and 
Richmond pleaded guilty to the persistent violator charge. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 94, L. 8 
- p. 97, L. 3). Before sentencing, Richmond moved for acquittal or for a new 
trial. (R., pp. 112-16.) The district court heard oral argument and issued a 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Richmond's motion. (R., pp. 126-32.) 
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The district court entered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Richmond to a 
unified term of nine years in prison, with two years fixed. (R., pp. 137-40.) On 
Richmond's petition for post-conviction relief, the district court entered an order 
vacating and reentering judgment to afford Richmond the opportunity to appeal. 
(R., p. 150.) Richmond timely appealed. (R., pp. 152-55.) 
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ISSUES 
Richmond states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court commit fundamental error by misdirecting the 
jury on self-defense? 
2. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a 
new trial because the court should have given a unanimity 
instruction? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Richmond failed to establish that the district court's jury instruction 
regarding self-defense amounted to fundamental error because he cannot 
show an error of constitutional magnitude that affected the outcome of his 
trial? 
2. Has Richmond failed to show error in the denial of his motion for a new 
trial because he cannot show error, let alone fundamental error, in the trial 
court's failure to give an unrequested special unanimity instruction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Richmond Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Jury Instruction 
Regarding Self-Defense Amounted To Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Richmond asserts the trial court erred in instructing the jury that an 
assault is justifiable as self-defense if defendant believed he was in "imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm," rather than "danger only of bodily injury." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Although he did not object at trial, Richmond argues the 
instruction amounted to fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Richmond's 
argument fails because, under applicable case law, the error was not of 
constitutional magnitude, and given the record, the error did not affect the 
outcome of proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, issues must be raised before the trial court to be considered on 
appeal. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). An 
exception applies for unobjected-to error depriving a criminal defendant of due 
process. lg.; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,820,229 P.3d 1179, 1182 
(2010). To establish such fundamental error, an appellant must demonstrate: (1) 
violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear and 
obvious without need to further develop the record; and (3) that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. This 
three-prong test applies where the unobjected-to error concerns jury instructions, 
as here. State v. Calver,_ P.3d _, 2013 WL 2396726 at *5 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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"Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law is a question of law over which [the appellate] Court 
exercises free review." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 
864-65 (2011) (citation omitted). For its review, the Court looks "at the jury 
instructions as a whole, not individually, to determine whether the jury was 
properly and adequately instructed." kl at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (citation 
omitted). 
C. Applying United States Supreme Court And Idaho Supreme Court Case 
Law, There Was No Constitutional Violation In The Trial Court's 
Instruction Regarding Self-Defense 
The disputed jury instruction - No. 20 - set forth five conditions, all of 
which "must be found to have been in existence at the time of the assault" in 
order to find that defendant "acted in self-defense." (R., p. 95.) Those 
conditions included: 
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that 
the action the defendant took was necessary to save the 
defendant from the danger presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable 
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that 
the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
injury and believed that the action taken was necessary. 
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger 
and not for some other motivation. 
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, 
the right of self-defense ends. 
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(R., p. 95; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 20 - p. 38, L. 18.) Instruction 20 used the model 
instruction, I.C.J. I. 1517, regarding self-defense or defense of another for either 
homicide or battery. I.C.J.I. 1517. However, the instruction uses the language 
"death or great bodily harm" and "death or great bodily injury," appropriate where 
the charge is homicide, rather than "bodily harm" and "bodily injury," appropriate 
where the charge is battery, or in this case, aggravated assault. (R., p. 95.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court found it was error for a trial court to instruct the 
jury on self-defense using the language "death or great bodily injury" where the 
charged offense was aggravated assault rather than homicide. State v. 
Woodward, 58 Idaho 385, _, 74 P.2d 92, 96-97 (1937) (discussing Deshazo v. 
State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 42, 37 S.W.2d 751, 752 (1931 )); see also State v. Hansen, 
133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus it was error for the 
district court in this case to use "great bodily injury" or harm rather than only 
"bodily injury" or harm in Instruction 20. But to satisfy the first prong of the 
fundamental error test, Richmond must show the trial court's error affects a 
constitutional right. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. He cannot meet 
this burden. 
Due Process demands that a jury find "beyond a reasonable doubt ... 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Martin v. 
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1987) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970)). "[T]he State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury 
instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." State 
v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) (citation omitted); 
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Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). However, the state has no 
constitutional burden to disprove an affirmative defense. Martin, 480 U.S. at 
232. A requirement that the state "assume[ ] the burden of disproving affirmative 
defenses" is a matter of state law; states that place the burden on defendants to 
prove an affirmative defense are not "in violation of the Constitution." kl (citing 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977)). 
Richmond does not assert the trial court erred in its instructions regarding 
the elements of aggravated assault. (See R., pp. 88, 91.) It is undisputed that 
the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, those facts for which the state had 
the burden of proof under the Constitution. The trial court properly instructed the 
jury, per Idaho law, 2 that the state had the burden of disproving Richmond's 
theory of self-defense. (R., p. 96.) Although the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury about the conditions required for self-defense, such error did not impact 
the state's constitutional burden of proof, and was therefore not fundamental 
error. 
Holding that fundamental errors in jury instructions were subject to 
appellate review, the Court commented, "Rule 30(b) would still forbid review of 
any error not so egregious that it produced manifest injustice by violating the 
defendant's due process rights under the federal or Idaho constitutions." State v. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). Under Rule 30(b), 
"No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless 
2 I.C. § 19-2112, which had placed the burden on defendant to prove self-
defense, was repealed by S. L. 1977, ch. 154, § 6. 
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the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection." I.C.R. 30(b). Commenting that its holding did not "reduce[] Criminal 
Rule 30(b) to a nullity," the Anderson Court reasoned, "Presumably, since most 
jury instruction errors do not double as manifestly unjust due process violations, 
Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) would apply in most cases in which no timely objection 
followed a trial court's error." Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. As 
contemplated in Anderson, Rule 30(b) applies here, to preclude Richmond's 
challenge. Because Richmond failed to object at trial, appellate review is limited 
to constitutional errors. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P .3d at 978. Under Martin, 
the error here was not of constitutional magnitude, therefore Richmond's 
argument fails. 
D. The Trial Court's Error Was Harmless 
Even if this Court were to disagree with Martin, and find the trial court's 
error was of constitutional import, Richmond cannot satisfy the third prong of 
Perry, that the error affected the outcome of proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978. In Perry, the Court addressed constitutional errors in jury 
instructions. kl at 222-24, 245 P.3d at 974-76. Where a constitutional error 
"affect[s] the entire deliberative process," then the "jury's deliberations [are] 
fundamentally flawed," and automatic reversal is warranted. kl at 223-24, 245 
P.3d at 975-76 (discussing Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Sullivan v. 
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Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)). Where instead, "jury instructions were only 
partially erroneous, such as where the jury instructions improperly omitted one 
element of a charged offense, the appellate court may apply the harmless error 
test." kl As already discussed, the jury instructions here did not omit or err as 
to any element of the charged offense, but used overly restrictive language for 
the conditions required to establish self-defense. (R., p. 95.) See Woodward, 58 
Idaho at_, 74 P.2d at 96-97. If the Court finds, despite Martin, that Richmond's 
constitutional rights were affected, the impact was at most partial, rather than to 
"the entire deliberative process." 
Applying the harmless error analysis, Richmond cannot show that the 
instructional error affected the outcome of proceedings. Notwithstanding the two 
instances of erroneous wording, Instruction 20 follows the language of I.C.J.I. 
1517, which is presumptively correct. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 
225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) (citation omitted). The third condition in Instruction 
20 provides, "The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable 
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant 
was in imminent danger . . and believed that the action taken was necessary." 
(R., p. 95 (emphasis added) (ellipses used in place of erroneous wording); Tr., 
Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 20 - p. 38, L. 18.) This reasonable person standard "is designed 
to prevent excessive force under the circumstances [by] the person claiming self-
defense." State v. Scroggins, 91 Idaho 847, 849, 433 P.2d 117, 119 (1967). 
Together, the conditions set forth in Instruction 20 and I.C.J.I. 1517 reflect the 
requirement in Idaho law that "the quantum of force that may be used in self-
13 
defense is dependent upon the nature of the attack upon the defendant." See 
Hansen, 133 Idaho at 352, 986 P.2d at 352. 
As part of Instruction 20, the jury was informed it must find all conditions 
for self-defense satisfied in order to find Richmond's assault was justified. (R. p. 
95.) Thus, Instruction 20 informed the jury that the state had to convince the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the listed conditions was not 
satisfied, to show that Richmond's assault was not justifiable. The record amply 
supports that the state met this state-law burden at trial. 
The second condition provided, "the defendant must have believed that 
the action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the 
danger presented." (R., p. 95.) The fifth condition provided, "When there is no 
longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of self-defense ends." 
(R., p. 95.) These conditions included no erroneous language, nor reference to 
the erroneous language. The record demonstrates that these conditions were 
not satisfied. 
Richmond testified that he patiently tried to calm and soothe Williams, 
who got upset describing a nightmare as he drove them from Garden City to 
Meridian. (Tr., p. 271, Ls. 9-10; p. 272, Ls. 1-16; p. 275, L 9 - p. 277, L. 17.) 
According to Richmond, Williams inexplicably punched him in the face after an 
unsuccessful effort to buy marijuana from a friend who was not home. (Tr., p. 
278, L. 22 - p. 279, L. 3; p. 280, Ls. 20-24.) Richmond testified that Williams 
punched him a second time, "right square in the face," then he pulled the car 
over to the side of the road. (Tr., p. 281, L. 16 - p. 283, L. 9.) Richmond 
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testified he told her to get out of the car, or "hold it together until [they] got 
home," because her behavior was "not going to work for us." (Tr., p. 283, L. 19 -
p. 284, L. 9.) Richmond claimed Williams told him he "needed to pay closer 
attention, that I'm not giving her the love and support that I should be giving her 
right at this particular moment." (Tr., p. 285, Ls. 9-18.) According to Richmond, 
Williams then grabbed him again and "she started pummeling me ... hitting me 
on the side of the head and face, and I was putting my hand up to block her from 
hitting me." (Tr., p. 286, Ls. 16-21.) 
Richmond testified they "were directly in oncoming traffic" and she "was 
right on top of me. She kept hitting me, and there was nothing else that I could 
do at that particular point, so I started to fight back." (Tr., p. 287, Ls. 3-15.) 
According to Richmond, he connected two solid contacts, hitting back at 
Williams. (Tr., p. 287, L. 17 - p. 288, L. 21.) He felt Williams "stop what she 
was doing," but because she was still pushing up against him, he did an "up-and-
under move," which involved grabbing her sweatshirt and pushing her into her 
seat. (Tr., p. 288, L. 22 - p. 289, L. 10.) 
His testimony stands in stark contrast to Williams' account. Williams 
testified Richmond began the drive angry with her, and that he screamed and 
cussed at her. (Tr., p. 158, L. 24 - p. 159, L. 16.) Williams testified that 
Richmond began punching her, hitting her eyes, nose, mouth, arms, legs, chest, 
and hands, and that she was "in and out of consciousness." (Tr., p. 160, L. 12 -
p. 161, L. 18.) Richmond also choked Williams with her seatbelt. (Tr., p. 162, L. 
19-p. 163, L. 5.) 
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Testimony by police who investigated the incident, the paramedic who 
arrived to treat her, and the bartender who called 911, described a heavily 
bleeding and swollen Williams. (Tr., p. 133, L. 25- p. 134, L. 4; p. 205, Ls. 2-25; 
p. 215, Ls. 15-17.) Police also testified Williams had strangulation marks, wider 
than finger-width, and consistent with "[a) lot of force." (Tr., p. 137, Ls. 19-24.) 
Police described Richmond as having "[b]lood on his hands and blood on his 
clothing," a "black-and-blue mark [in the] area of the right eye," and swelling on 
his right hand's knuckles and fingers. (Tr., p. 143, Ls. 2-4; p. 144, Ls. 18-9; p. 
146, Ls. 3-6.) Another officer testified the car where the assault occurred had "a 
bunch of blood ... on the front passenger's seat," the backrest, and center 
console, as well as the back passenger's seat. (Tr., p. 230, L. 4 - p. 232, L. 15.) 
The evidence fails to support the inference that beating Williams bloody 
and strangling her with her seatbelt was reasonable self-defense. Even if 
restraining her by choking her with a seatbelt were easier than pulling over, the 
evidence fails to demonstrate that the force used to batter and choke Williams 
was limited to that necessary to save Richmond from either battery or a driving 
hazard. (See R., p. 95). Williams' injuries, as described by four different 
witnesses at trial support use of force far exceeding the two punches Richmond 
admitted to. The paramedic testified, "the area of the injury, the different 
locations of the injury[,] it would be hard to accomplish with one strike." (Tr., p. 
205, Ls. 16-18.) The record demonstrates that Richmond's physical attack on 
Williams far exceeded what was needed to defend himself given the alleged 
danger presented. 
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Further, Richmond acknowledged doing the "up-and-under move" after 
Williams stopped fighting, but was "still pushing up against me." (Tr., p. 288, L. 
22 - p. 289, L. 11.) According to Richmond, he kept Williams in her seat this 
way, and managed to continue driving the rest of the way to his mother's house. 
(Tr., p. 290, L. 2 - p. 291, L. 16.) This appears to be Richmond's explanation for 
the strangulation marks on Williams' neck, which police described as "very wide," 
involving a "lot of force," and "consistent with rug burns, peeling skin ... extreme 
discoloration all the way from her jawline ... down to the bottom of her throat." 
(Tr., p. 137, L. 19 - p. 138, L. 3.) The record does not support a reasonable 
appearance of danger justifying the force used in Richmond's "up-and-under" 
strangulation move, causing Williams' injuries as described by police. If 
Richmond was able to continue driving to his mother's house, he was able to pull 
the car over and come to a stop; Richmond did not need to strangle Williams. 
The record supports that one or more of the conditions in Instruction 20 
that were unaffected by the erroneous language was not satisfied. Accordingly, 
the evidence demonstrated that Richmond's attack and consequent threat of 
violence against Williams was not justifiable, regardless of the erroneous 
language in the affected conditions. In other words, the erroneous language did 
not contribute to the jury's verdict. The trial court's error was therefore harmless. 
Richmond has failed to establish the third prong required for fundamental error, 
thus his argument should be rejected. 
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11. 
Richmond Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Richmond argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial based on the trial court's failure to give a unanimity instruction. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 13-18.) Because Richmond did not object to the lack of a unanimity 
instruction, he must show fundamental error such that a new trial was warranted. 
Richmond has failed to establish the elements required for fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court "exercises free review over whether a jury was given 
proper instructions." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 
(2009). 
C. Richmond Cannot Show Error, Let Alone Fundamental Error, In The Trial 
Court's Failure To Give An Unrequested Special Unanimity Instruction 
Richmond did not object to the jury instructions at trial, let alone request a 
special unanimity instruction. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 31, Ls. 6-10.) Instead, he raised the 
issue in a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied, on determination 
that a unanimity instruction was not needed. (R., pp. 112-16, 127-32.) On its 
review of the district court's order denying the motion, this Court freely reviews 
whether the lack of a unanimity instruction was in accordance with state law. 
Draper, 151 Idaho at 587-88, 261 P.3d at 864-65. 
The general rule that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial ... serves to induce the timely 
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raising of claims and objections, which gives the [trial] court the opportunity to 
consider and resolve them." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976 (citations 
omitted). "In the case of an actual or invited procedural error, the [trial] court can 
often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate 
outcome." ~ (citing Puckett v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009)). Thus, "when 
an error has not been properly preserved for appeal through objection at trial, the 
appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases 
where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth 
Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." ~ (citation 
omitted). This fundamental error rule applies here. Because Richmond did not 
object at trial, he must satisfy the fundamental error test established in Perry. 
As already discussed, to establish such fundamental error, an appellant 
must demonstrate: ( 1) violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the 
error is clear and obvious without need to further develop the record; and (3) that 
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 
P.3d at 978. Because Richmond was not entitled to a unanimity instruction, he 
has failed to show error in the failure to give such an instruction, much less 
fundamental error entitling him to reversal of his conviction. 
The jury here was instructed that its verdict must be unanimous. (Tr., p. 
44, Ls. 1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[a]n instruction that the 
jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense . . . is 
generally not required." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 
446 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Severson, 147 Idaho at 711,215 P.3d at 
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431). The exception to this general rule is when a defendant commits different 
criminal acts, each of which constitute "separate incidents involving distinct 
unions of mens rea and actus reas." lsL at 475, 272 P.3d at 447. Where each 
of multiple acts "would independently support a conviction for the crime 
charged," the jury must be instructed "that it must unanimously agree on the 
specific occurrence giving rise to the offense." Severson, 147 Idaho at 711, 215 
P.3d at 431. 
Where the evidence supports "separate, distinct, and independent 
crime[s], rather than [one] continuing course of conduct without end," the courts 
will conclude there were multiple offenses, and a special unanimity instruction is 
warranted. Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267, 16 P.3d 937, 943 (Ct. App. 
2000). "A specific unanimity instruction is required only where it appears that 
there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as 
the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different 
acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In this case, the state charged Richmond with a single criminal act -
aggravated assault. The Information charged Richmond with attempting "to 
commit a violent injury upon the person of Michelle Williams, by a means and/or 
force likely to produce great bodily harm, to-wit: by punching her in the head 
and/or face causing severe swelling and bruising to her eyes and face, and 
bleeding to her nose and/or by grabbing her by the neck and applying pressure." 
(R., pp. 24-25.) Richmond asserts there was evidence of two separate and 
distinct criminal acts of aggravated assault upon which the state was relying in 
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order to prove that charge - namely, "punching and strangling." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 16-18.) But punching and strangling are acts of battery - "willful and 
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." I.C. § 18-903(a). 
An assault is an "unlawful attempt ... with apparent ability, to commit a 
violent injury to the person of another." I.C. § 18-901(a). Assault also includes 
"an intentional and unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of 
another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which 
creates a well-founded fear ... that such violence is imminent." I.C. § 18-901 (b). 
An aggravated assault, charged here, includes an assault "by any means or 
force likely to produce great bodily harm." I.C. § 18-905(b). In other words, an 
aggravated assault is the threat of violence, creating a well-founded fear of such 
imminent violence, by means likely to produce great bodily harm. 
The evidence demonstrates that Richmond was appropriately charged 
with a single count of aggravated assault, based on his threatening behavior, 
which included punching and strangling. (R., pp. 24-25.) The entire assault took 
place in Richmond's car on a drive from Garden City to Meridian. (Tr., p. 164, 
Ls. 2-7.) Testimony from both Williams and Richmond shows that, once 
Richmond's threatening behavior began, it was uninterrupted. Richmond's 
punching and strangling of Williams would not each independently support a 
conviction for aggravated assault. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 711,215 P.3d at 
431. Richmond's assault on Williams, in Richmond's car during one drive, was 
one continuous threat of great bodily harm, based on multiple physical acts of 
violence. See Miller, 135 Idaho at 267, 16 P.3d at 943. Accordingly, Richmond 
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was not entitled to a special unanimity instruction. Richmond has therefore 
failed to show error, let alone fundamental error, and his argument should be 
rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction and order denying Richmond's motion for a new trial. 
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